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Two Ontological Orientations in Sociology: 
Building Social Ontologies and Blurring the Boundaries of the ‘Social’ 
The article highlights two contrasting ways in which social theorists have been trying to 
define the ontological boundaries of sociology since the early days of the discipline. Some 
(e.g. Durkheim, Weber, and critical realists) have attempted to demarcate social reality as 
a causally autonomous and qualitatively distinct realm in a segmented/stratified universe. 
Others (e.g. Tarde, Spencer, Luhmann, sociobiologists, and actor-network theorists) have 
postulated a more open ontological space and blurred such demarcations by either 
rejecting the causal autonomy of sociological phenomena, or their qualitative 
distinctiveness, or both. So far, there has been little convergence between these two 
orientations since according to the former, the opening of the boundaries is likely to give 
way to reductionist conceptions of society, whereas the latter tends to associate rigid 
boundaries with essentialism. Through a close examination of these opposing orientations, 
the article aims to shed light on current ontological dilemmas of sociology. 
Keywords: Ontology, Social Ontology, Evolutionary Theory, Systems Theory, Actor-
Network Theory, Critical Realism, History of Sociology 
 
 In recent decades, there has been a veritable growth in ontological inquiries in sociology – 
so much so that some scholars now talk about an ‘ontological turn’ in social theory (Latsis et al. 
2007). Carried out mostly, though not exclusively, by scholars associated with critical realism 
(e.g. Archer et al. 1998; Lawson et al. 2007), such inquiries involve diverse arguments about 
whether society is essentially chaotic or structured, subjective or objective, and so on. Ultimately, 
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these studies often have as their central concern to establish a ‘social ontology’ – that is, a theory 
which mainly purports to describe the nature of social reality per se. As such, this ‘turn’ 
presupposes a predominantly inward ontological orientation, ‘motivated by concerns that are 
generated within the social sciences’ (Latsis et al., 2007: 6). 
 In the same period, however, there has also been another ontologically significant 
development in sociology, even if this is not usually described as a ‘turn’. Namely, sociologists 
from very different perspectives – ranging from sociobiology to actor-network theory – have 
begun to show interest in entities that remain beyond the traditional ontological boundaries of the 
discipline, such as technological artefacts, neural networks, genes, microbes, and so on. One 
salient feature of these recent contributions is that they offer new conceptualizations about the 
relations between sociological and ‘other’ types of phenomena. At stake in these new 
conceptualizations, therefore, is not so much the ‘inner’ nature of social reality but rather its 
‘outer’ limits. As such, this latter type of inquiries might perhaps be characterized as a second 
‘turn’, which assumes a more outward ontological orientation than the first one.  
 That in contemporary sociology it is possible to identify two ontological orientations 
constitutes our starting point. But there is more to the story. To begin with, it is crucial to note 
that the concept of social ontology, which constitutes the main focus of the first orientation, only 
makes sense, if one presupposes that the ‘social’ has rather clear-cut boundaries. But the moment 
one questions the existence of such boundaries and posits various relations or commonalities 
between different ontological domains (which is precisely what the second ontological 
orientation is about), the very notion of the social begins to become problematic (Candea, 2012; 
Joyce, 2002). In this sense, there is also a significant opposition between these two orientations. 
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Moreover, and equally importantly, much indicates that this opposition is not unique to 
contemporary literature. As we shall see, these contrasting tendencies have persisted, albeit in 
different forms, throughout the history of sociology. 
 So far, this persistent opposition has not been an object of sustained analysis. Yet, as we 
shall try to show in this article, such an analysis might constitute a fruitful starting point for 
exploring two different kinds of ontological universes envisioned by social theorists. More 
generally, since each universe implies different possibilities, problems and limits for sociological 
inquiry, this analysis can also contribute to our understanding of the ‘state of the discipline’, at 
least as far as its ontological dilemmas and tensions are concerned. 
 This is, then, essentially a diagnostic paper. Our primary aim is to reveal the main 
characteristics of the two orientations, rather than to overcome, in one way or another, the 
opposition between them. This descriptive approach is fully intentional. In fact, what we 
ultimately wish to underline in this article is that the question of how to interpret and deal with 
this persistent opposition itself has a profound ontological significance for sociology. For, sooner 
or later, in trying to tackle this question we arrive at a major dilemma: should we see this 
persistent opposition as a failure of social theorists to come up with a ‘synthesis’ or should we 
consider it as a trademark of sociology as a discipline, the uniqueness of which lies in constantly 
questioning and reconstructing its objects of inquiry? We shall return to this important point in 
the conclusion. 
 The Conceptual Framework of Analysis 
 Theories that adopt a similar ontological orientation often differ immensely in other (e.g. 
methodological) respects. Revealing the contrasting ontological tendencies in the literature, 
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therefore, requires a dedicated analysis which looks beyond these differences (and which often 
results in the grouping together of theories that are usually viewed as belonging to very different 
traditions). In undertaking such an analysis, we shall focus on two fundamental issues: namely, 
the qualitative and causal peculiarities of sociological phenomena. More precisely, we shall 
delineate the two ontological orientations in terms of the divergent answers they give to two basic 
questions: 
 1. The first question revolves around the issue of whether one sees an unsurpassable 
qualitative difference between sociological and other phenomena – or, conversely, whether one 
posits a basic quality (an element or process) that is common to all. 
 2. The second question is whether one attributes sociological phenomena causal 
autonomy – or, conversely, whether one posits causal relationships between sociological and 
'other' kinds of phenomena. 
 Where do these questions come from and what is their importance? Let us begin by noting 
that we did not simply devise them from scratch with the aim of imposing them upon the theories 
we analyse as a mere logical scheme. Rather, these questions are immanent to the texts 
considered here. Not only have they been raised in European philosophy at least since the 
seventeenth century in the analysis of the relationships between the ontological domains of 
society, nature and the individual self (see, for example: Seigel, 2005) but, as we shall see, they 
have also been taken up by social theorists repeatedly since the nineteenth century. This is not so 
surprising since sociology was born in an academic landscape which was already occupied by 
other disciplines – especially the natural sciences – and, therefore, its practitioners, all from the 
beginning, were faced with the problem of determining the differences and similarities, and 
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autonomy or interrelatedness of phenomena that can be delineated as ‘sociological’ with respect 
to others. 
 But the ultimate importance of these questions for our purposes here lies in the four 
distinct ways they can be – and, historically, have indeed been – answered, which attribute to 
sociological phenomena:  
A.) both qualitative distinctiveness and causal autonomy;  
B.) only qualitative distinctiveness but not causal autonomy;  
C.) causal autonomy but not qualitative distinctiveness;  
D.) and, neither.  
Since these answers specify the distinctiveness and autonomy of sociological phenomena in 
relation to others, in effect, they can be seen as different ways of conceiving the ontological 
boundaries of sociology. To clarify further, of these four basic answers, it is mainly the first – 
‘sociological phenomena are qualitatively distinct and causally autonomous’ – which serves as a 
basis for the notion of social ontology. As we shall see, it is indeed on the basis of this 
presupposition that contributors to the first ontological orientation (e.g. Durkheim, Weber and 
critical realists) have been trying to establish highly divergent social ontologies. All the 
remaining three answers, however, imply an ‘opening’ in the ontological boundaries of sociology, 
either by denying causal autonomy, or qualitative distinctiveness, or both. We shall suggest that 
these three answers (B, C, and D) can best be exemplified by certain evolutionary approaches, 
Luhmann’s system theory, and actor-network theory, respectively. 
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 The two questions and the associated four answers, then, can be seen as the basic 
elements of a ‘typology’, by which we aim to bring some clarity to the existing ontological 
orientations in the literature (see, Table 1 for an overview). We primarily focus on the above-
mentioned theories because their propositions constitute the closest approximations of the four 
answers. It is important to note in this context that not all theoretical approaches in the literature 
subscribe to a single answer. Thus, many notable theoretical traditions are excluded from our 
discussion because they can accommodate multiple ontological orientations.
1
 
 In what follows, we shall follow the basic scheme outlined above, starting with the first 
answer (A) and the first ontological orientation. We shall then turn to the other three answers (B, 
C, and D), which constitute the main currents of the second orientation and which stand in a more 
or less tense relation to the first. 
 
The First Ontological Orientation: Building Social Ontologies 
 The idea that ‘sociological phenomena have distinct qualities and causal autonomy’ has a 
long history. Indeed, its two ‘classic’ versions can be traced back to the works of Durkheim and 
Weber. We shall begin with a brief discussion of these works since they give us important clues 
about a much broader inclination in the history of social theory. 
 As is well-known, Durkheim saw no essential methodological differences between natural 
and social sciences, encouraging sociologists to borrow concepts from other disciplines. This 
methodological congruity, however, did not entail ontological identity. Thus, he also emphasized 
that such borrowed concepts were bound to ‘appear in sociology under entirely new aspects’ 
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(Durkheim, 1938: 142). More generally, for Durkheim (1938: 1), ‘there is in every society a 
certain group of phenomena which may be differentiated from those studied by the other natural 
sciences’ – namely, social facts. Social facts do not just constitute ‘a category of facts with very 
distinctive characteristics’, but they are also causally autonomous: ‘a social fact can be explained 
only by another social fact’ (Durkheim, 1938: 145). 
 In heralding the qualitative and causal irreducibility of sociological phenomena, 
Durkheim’s sociology is quite paradigmatic. But it is certainly not the only one. Despite 
enormous differences in other respects,
2
 Weber’s ontological premises have a number of 
profound similarities with Durkheim’s. To begin with, Weber (1949: 77-81) proposes a 
fundamental qualitative distinction between generalizable, meaningless impulse-response chains 
that belong to the order of natural phenomena and ‘human actions’ that are driven by culturally 
significant meanings and values; ‘culture’, for him, is a unique ‘segment’ in the overall 
‘meaningless infinity of the world process’. Moreover, on the basis of this distinction, Weber also 
draws a sharp line between causal explanations in natural and social sciences, where the latter 
primarily deal with the question of how meaningful actions interact with other meaningful 
actions: ‘without reference to meaning’, such actions or their products (e.g. artefacts) remain 
‘wholly unintelligible’ (Weber, 1964: 88-94). 
 Now, one crucial point for our analysis here is that, although Durkheim and Weber 
propose radically different social ontologies, they converge in drawing rather clear-cut 
boundaries for social reality. This implies that it is possible to attribute very different qualities 
and causal mechanisms to sociological phenomena, while subscribing to the idea that such 
phenomena occupy a unique place in a neatly divided ontological universe. This is, indeed, a 
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long-lasting inclination in the history of social theory, which goes far beyond Durkheim and 
Weber. 
 To begin with, many of Durkheim’s and Weber’s predecessors – and contemporaries – 
were already advocating social ontologies similar to theirs. For example, as is well-known, 
Comte (1875) anticipated much of the ‘holistic’ perspective of Durkheim, stressing the 
impossibility of ‘decomposing’ society into more elementary parts. Similarly, social ontologies 
centring around the notions of ‘meaning’ and ‘values’ were already prevalent in the works of 
many nineteenth century neo-Kantian philosophers – most notably, Rickert – to whom Weber 
(1949:50) often acknowledged his debt (see, especially: Rose, 1981).  
 But the inclination to demarcat  the ontological domain of sociology with clear 
boundaries is not peculiar to the classical era. It persists also in more recent theoretical 
approaches that propose considerably different social ontologies than Durkheim and Weber (e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1973). Most notably, these assumptions are also central to the 
theoretical tradition that has contributed extensively to the current ontological inquiries in 
sociology; namely, critical realism. 
 As is well-known, of particular interest to sociologists with a critical realist affiliation is 
Bhaskar’s conceptualization of society as an emergent reality. For Bhaskar (1989: 45), the 
‘activity-, concept-, and space-time-dependence of social structures’ sets ‘major ontological 
limits’ on the possibility of approaching societies with a naturalistic ontology. Thus, Bhaskar 
insists on differentiating the subject-matter of social sciences from that of natural sciences. More 
specifically, both qualitative distinctiveness and causal autonomy are integral to the key concepts 
in this literature: stratification, emergence and morphogenesis (Archer, 1995, 2003; Bhaskar, 
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1989). Whatever its underlying strata might be, social reality emerges as a qualitatively distinct 
realm with its peculiar formative and transformative dynamics. 
 On the basis of these general principles, critical realists often attempt to go beyond 
objectivist and subjectivist social ontologies. One important example is Archer (2003), who 
brings to focus the phenomenon of ‘internal conversation’ as the ‘mediating process’ between 
structure and agency. It is through these internal dialogues that individual agents contemplate on 
structural forces in their environment and attempt to give a shape to their existence. However 
fallible these attempts might be, it is above all this capacity of human actors that gives social 
reality an irreducible character, while also making it inherently transformable. And, although 
Archer (2003) opposes the idea that this reflexive capacity is an exclusively social product, this 
does not lead her to propose a causal link between, say, biologic and social processes. Archer’s 
(1995) theory is ultimately a social ontology: there is such a thing as social reality, which is 
unlike any other reality, even if it does not have an immutable form. 
 In concluding this section, it is worth acknowledging that our attempt to group together 
such diverse theories in the same category might seem rather controversial. After all, in the 
existing literature, Durkheim, Weber and critical realists are hardly ever considered to share a 
similar ontological perspective. Yet, the above analysis indicates that they converge in at least 
three important respects. First, they all draw various boundaries around social reality and fill this 
space with different social ontologies. Secondly, in doing so, they envision a highly segmented 
and/or stratified ontological universe – where, in one distinctive region, social reality shines forth 
with all its uniqueness, calling for the undivided attention of sociologists. And, thirdly, operating 
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in such a divided universe, they are all concerned about ‘protecting’ the boundaries of social 
reality from ‘external’ intrusions that can give way to reductionist conceptions of that reality. 
 To qualify this last point further, however, it is worth noting that the divisions drawn by 
the above theorists have never been absolute. Thus, for example, Durkheim (2001) suggests that 
the striking cross-cultural diversity in the conceptions of the sacred and the profane might owe its 
existence to the unique bio-psychic characteristics of human species (Hammond, 1983). 
Similarly, Weber (1964: 94) recognizes that certain ‘meaningless’ (e.g. natural or bio-psychic) 
factors might also influence human actions and can be taken into account as ‘data’. A much more 
refined version of this idea can be found in Bhaskar’s theory of emergence, which maintains that 
specific ‘causal powers’ – e.g. causal mechanisms peculiar to society – emerge at specific ‘levels’ 
of reality and, therefore, require a dedicated analysis at that level. As Elder-Vass (2007: 170) 
points out, however, when it comes to actual events, the theory of emergence also implies that 
such specific causal powers ‘are combined with a multiplicity of causal mechanisms from other 
levels of the ontological strata’. Thus, Bhaskar’s theory recognizes ‘the inherent inter-relatedness 
of the different [ontological] levels’ (Elder-Vass, 2007: 170).  
 The crucial point is that, this ‘interrelatedness’ is largely overshadowed in the works of 
Bhaskar and other contributors to the first orientation by the emphasis put – often in fear of 
opening the doors to reductionism – on the sui generis nature of social reality. As we shall now 
see, this interrelatedness plays a far more prominent role in the second ontological orientation. 
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The Second Ontological Orientation: Blurring the Boundaries of the ‘Social’ 
 The prevalence of an inclination to draw thick boundaries around social reality in the 
works of Durkheim and Weber was perhaps not so surprising. After all, both were trying to carve 
out a distinct ontological domain for their then vaguely recognized enterprise. This, however, 
does not mean that in its formative years sociology was ontologically more monistic than today. 
Many other theorists writing in this era too were in search of an ontological ground for sociology, 
but they did not follow the same route. Let us briefly highlight some of these earlier attempts, 
which anticipate, at least in certain important respects, the more current versions of the second 
ontological orientation we shall discuss in a moment. 
 To begin with, Tarde’s (1899) opposition to Durkheim’s social ontology is well-known 
(Candea, 2012). But Tarde was not simply offering an alternative social ontology. Rather, he was 
trying to conceptualize social processes as specific instants of universal processes that applied to 
all phenomena in the universe (such as ‘repetition’ and ‘opposition’). In this sense, as Deleuze 
(1994: 313-314) puts it, his sociology was based on a cosmological rather than a social ontology 
(we shall return to Tarde later). A similar notion is also central to Simmel (2009: 27), who 
maintains that the alleged reality denoted by ‘the general concept [of] society’ is only ‘an 
apparently independent historical reality’. Like Tarde, even in his sociological works preceding 
his ‘life-philosophy’, he views ‘social life’ as a continuation of elementary ‘life processes’ in 
general (see, especially: Simmel, 2009:229). Just as Tarde’s arguments irritated Durkheim, this 
tendency in Simmel’s work bothered Weber (1972) considerably, even if he also acknowledged 
Simmel’s (1977) work on ‘historical forms’ as a major source of inspiration for his interpretive 
sociology (Weber, 1975). A similarly ambivalent relation exists also between Weber and Dilthey. 
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Like Weber, Dilthey (1991) insisted on distinguishing human sciences from natural sciences, 
emphasizing the mental/spiritual content of the former, which he characterized as 
Geisteswissenschaften. At the same time, however, like Simmel, especially in his earlier work, 
Dilthey suggested that intellectual and cultural systems can be conceived as the crystallizations of 
more elementary forms of life.  
 Finally, to this list we can also add what McKinnon (2010) has called Spencer’s ‘energetic 
sociology’, which draws links between inorganic, organic and social processes. Spencer (1900: 
367) does indeed conceive evolution as a ‘cosmic process’, which involves ‘an integration of 
matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from a relatively 
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity’ (cited in Offer, 
2010a: 308). Spencer’s theory, as Offer (2010a) stresses, is not simply Darwinian but rather based 
on ‘a pre-Darwinian providential or quasi-deistic conception’ and, as such, is substantially 
different than the ‘selectionist paradigm’ that underlies the contemporary evolutionary 
approaches that we will discuss below. Nevertheless, he too proceeds with a ‘cosmic’ ontology, 
which considerably blurs the boundaries of sociological phenomena.
3
 
 Although in highly modified forms, especially in the latter half of the twentieth century 
ontological orientations akin to those of Tarde, Simmel and Spencer have gained growingly more 
recognition. In what follows, we shall highlight three main currents in this literature. Before 
proceeding further, however, we should note that, like the diverse approaches comprising the first 
ontological orientation, the three theories we shall discuss below – evolutionary approaches, 
Luhmann’s system theory and actor-network theory – are not usually considered as belonging to 
a similar tradition. Yet, again, they concur in several important respects: they all blur, in one way 
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or another, the boundaries of the ‘social’; they all postulate a more or less open ontological 
universe; and, indeed, they often see in the attempts for segmenting this space with rigid 
borderlines an ‘essentializing’ tendency. But they do all this on the basis of quite different 
assumptions. Let us begin with the first one. 
  Sociological phenomena have distinct qualities but not causal autonomy 
 The most vivid example of this assumption can be observed in some versions of what 
might loosely be called ‘evolutionary’ approaches in the social sciences, which emerged in post-
1970s.
4
 The main idea here is characterized by Runciman (1998) as the ‘selectionist paradigm’, 
which implies that selective processes ‘analogous but not reducible’ to those in nature are at work 
in socio-cultural reality (see also: Offer, 2010a).
5
 Thus, for example, culture and genes are often 
viewed as constituting two distinct information systems shaping human behaviour. More 
specifically, most contributors to this literature (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, 1981; Durham, 1991) tend to agree on one basic point: although both cultural norms (or 
practices) and genes are prone to structurally similar processes (variation, transmission, and 
selection), they have entirely different contents (e.g. ideas and molecular structures) and 
mechanisms (e.g. imitation/learning and biologic reproduction). Culture and genes (or, socio-
cultural and natural selection), therefore, constitute qualitatively distinct phenomena – so much 
so that, for some proponents of this approach, ‘the existence of culture causes human evolution to 
be fundamentally different than that of noncultural organisms’ (Boyd and Richerson, 1985: 99). 
 At the same time, central to these theories is the idea that, despite this qualitative chasm, 
socio-cultural and biological processes can mutually exert selective pressures on each other and, 
thereby, somehow causally interact with each other. There are, however, diverse ways in which 
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this ‘causal interaction’ is specified, especially because contributors to this literature have 
divergent views about to what extent cultural norms/practices can be at odds with natural 
selection. Thus, while some approaches view culture as a kind of auxiliary mechanism for 
selecting and retaining biologically adaptive human practices, others emphasize that many 
maladaptive – or, below optimum – practices from a biological point of view can be culturally 
selected and nurtured (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). And, yet some others opt for a multi-mode 
conceptualization (Durham, 1991). Finally, not all evolutionary approaches extend their analysis 
of causal links to genes, as is the case with some sociobiological theories drawing on 
evolutionary psychology (Tooby and Cosmides, 1989). Similarly, TenHouten’s (2005) 
‘neurosociology’ attempts to draw causal links between social structures, cultural conceptions 
and neural structures, leaving aside genotypic variation. 
 Evolutionary approaches, then, do not so much propose a new social ontology. Rather, by 
causally linking sociological processes with biologic or neural processes in one way or another, 
they open a ‘hole’ in the boundaries of the ‘social’, and thereby render, even if partially, the very 
concept of social ontology problematic. As such, they stand in a tense relationship with those 
approaches that assume that sociological phenomena can only be rendered intelligible through the 
identification of those causes that are intrinsic to socio-cultural reality. In fact, for many theorists 
adopting an evolutionary perspective, such an assumption implies an essentialist and parochial 
attitude, which ignores not only the interactions between social and natural processes but also the 
recent findings especially in the life sciences (e.g. Durham, 1991; TenHouten, 2005; Van den 
Berghe, 1990). 
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 Causal autonomy but not entirely distinctive qualities 
 In almost diametric opposition to the previous approach, some contemporary theories 
insist on the causal autonomy of sociological phenomena but largely deny that there is a 
fundamental qualitative difference which differentiates these phenomena from others. Luhmann’s 
systems theory constitutes the most vivid example of such an ontological perspective.
6
 According 
to this theory, living bodies, minds and societies all share the common quality of being ‘self-
referential systems’. Yet – or rather because of this – they remain ‘operationally closed’ to each 
other and retain their causal autonomy. 
 The origins of modern systems theory can be traced back to holism as a meta-theoretical 
approach, which basically suggests that the existence/function of parts would remain 
unintelligible without taking into consideration the whole in which they are embedded. One of 
the trademarks of ‘traditional’ holism has been the conceptualization of the ‘whole’ as a self-
organizing ‘close system’. Especially in the second half of the twentieth century, however, this 
idea has been the target of severe criticisms, eventually giving way to the theory of ‘open 
systems’. As Von Bertalanffy (1969) underlines in his pioneering work, in this new version of 
systems theory, a system is not isolated from its environment in any absolute sense but it 
nevertheless manages to generate and sustain a different organization of reality within its 
boundaries (see also: Bateson, 1999; Maturana and Varela, 1980). 
 Luhmann (1995) embraces the idea of open systems fully, viewing the earlier holistic 
approaches in sociology, as well as those that privilege ‘human agency’, as archaic forms of 
essentialism that can be overcome in light of the recent findings in, among others, information 
science and cybernetics. According to him, in this respect, the most radical novelty in 
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contemporary systems theory is brought about by the theory of self-referential systems, which 
provides a unique answer to the question of how a system can remain open to its environment and 
yet differentiate itself from it: ‘The theory of self-referential systems maintains that … systems 
refer to themselves (be this to elements of the same system, to operations of the same system, or 
to the unity of the same system) in constituting their elements and their elemental relations’ 
(Luhmann 1995: 9; 1990). In this sense, a self-referential system does not first exist and then 
refer to itself, but rather it is by referring to itself that it gains a distinct existence; as such, it does 
not really ‘react’ to its environment but only to its internal milieu. Self-referential systems, 
therefore, constitute a paradigmatic model for causal autonomy: ‘only [they] create for 
themselves the possibility of ordering causalities by distribution over system and environment’ 
(Luhmann, 1995: 10). This principle also applies to social systems as self-referential 
communicative systems. 
 Luhmann’s theory, then, blurs the boundaries of the social in a very different direction 
than the evolutionary approaches; namely, by postulating not a causal link but a fundamental 
qualitative commonality between organisms, minds and societies.
7
 This commonality is not that 
of a common substance or essence. Rather, if there is an ‘ontology’ in Luhmann (2006), it is an 
ontology of difference: what is common to organisms, minds and societies is their propensity to 
develop their identity through differing. It is in this sense that Luhmann (1995) presents his 
theory of society as a contribution to general systems theory. As such, here, we see another 
dimension of the tension between the first and second orientations: social ontology becomes 
subsumed under a more general ontology, perhaps somewhat similar to the earlier attempts to 
conceptualize social processes within a broader ‘vital’ or ‘cosmological’ ontology. 
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 Sociological phenomena have neither distinct qualities nor causal autonomy 
 Any reductionist theory that conceives ‘society’ as a product of some ‘non-social’ process 
would naturally also claim that sociological phenomena have neither distinct qualities, nor causal 
autonomy. Actor-network theory (hereafter ANT) too views ‘society’ as a surface effect of 
something else – i.e. heterogeneous networks – but with an important twist. These heterogeneous 
networks are posited as the authentic ‘subject matter’ of sociological inquiry. As John Law (1992: 
380) puts it: ‘the metaphor
8
 of heterogeneous network lies at the heart of actor-network theory, 
and is a way of suggesting that society, organizations, agents and machines are all effects 
generated in patterned networks of diverse (not simply human) materials’. 
 Perhaps the best way to start our discussion on ANT is to compare it with the Weberian 
and Durkheimian social ontologies considered above, which as we have seen, assert the 
distinctiveness of sociological phenomena in two ways: either by emphasizing the differences 
between cultural and natural phenomena, or by emphasizing the objective, independent existence 
of social facts. ANT attempts to refute both schemes as well as the various later attempts to 
‘synthesize’ them (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990), detecting in most of them an ‘essentializing’ tendency. In 
fact, none of the concepts that have been taken as an ‘essential’ ontological starting point in social 
theory so far is deemed to be sufficient to do the job: ‘[n]ot action, nor the actor, nor interaction, 
nor the individual, nor the symbol, nor the system, nor society, nor their numerous combinations’ 
(Latour, 1996: 238). 
 ANT’s opposition to those theories that defend the distinctiveness of sociological 
phenomena on the basis of a distinction between conscious human actors and non-human entities 
follows two routes. First, some actor-network theorists point out that if there is indeed anything 
Page 17 of 29 Sociology Paper For Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
18 
 
that makes ‘human societies’ different from other animal societies, it is the fact that they are not 
only composed of human beings; sociology cannot go too far without the inclusion of ‘objects’ in 
its ontological domain (Latour, 1996). And, secondly, actor-network theorists refuse to posit an 
exclusive link between action and conscious subjects, attributing a much broader sense to 
‘action’. When, say, a basketball player throws the ball to the basket, or when a political activist 
initiates a social movement, their ‘actions’ take place only in specific ‘nodes’ and are 
accompanied by the ‘actions’ of a whole set of other heterogeneous actors that influence the 
course of events: ‘Action is not done under the full control of consciousness; actions should 
rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies’ (Latour, 
2005: 44). 
 In opposition to the second major way of attributing a causal and qualitative uniqueness to 
sociological phenomena (by emphasizing the sui generis reality of social facts), ANT stresses 
that these theories fail to give an account of the emergence, stabilization and dissemination of 
such facts and instead take them for granted. This objection was first raised by Tarde (1899: 46), 
who opposed Durkheimians by noting that ‘in thus postulating a collective force, which implies 
the conformity of millions of men acting together, they overlook … the problem of explaining 
how such general assimilation could ever have taken place’. Tarde’s objection to positing society 
as an a priori reality is based on two interrelated arguments. First, he stresses that ‘society’ 
cannot be treated as a static reality; there is no society but only processes of ‘becoming society’. 
And, secondly, he insists that these processes and mechanisms through which society is produced 
should be of more primary interest to sociology than the ever temporary products (e.g. the 
Durkheimian social facts). Somewhat retrospectively, ANT can be seen as building on this 
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Tardean heritage, with a further emphasis on the role of non-human actors in the production of 
society. 
 The crucial point for our concerns here is that, for ANT, there is no being in the universe 
that is social (or non-social) due to some intrinsic quality (Latour, 1996: 237). This, in effect, 
means that there is no essential difference between, say, ‘social facts’ and other ‘things’. In ANT, 
‘society’ becomes the generic term for any kind of ‘thing’ – ‘assembly’ – that results from a 
process of assembling.
9
 Thus, Latour (2005: 14) affirms Tarde’s statement that ‘every thing is a 
society’ and, inverting the Durkheimian proposition that ‘social facts should be treated like 
things’, he proposes ‘to treat things as social facts’ (1996: 240). ANT’s motto might therefore be 
formulated as: there is no such thing as society, because every thing is a society. 
 With ANT, therefore, we reach one of the most extreme points of the second ontological 
orientation, which proposes a de-stratified (or ‘flat’) ontological universe where the boundaries 
of the ‘social’ are almost completely demolished. In this respect, the ontological orientation of 
ANT forms a vivid contrast especially with that of critical realism (see: Elder-Vass, 2008). This 
contrast can be seen as the most current as well as, perhaps, the most ‘refined’ version of the 
opposition between the two ontological orientations we have high ighted in this article – but it is 
certainly not the only example. 
Conclusion 
 In this article, we have tried to bring to focus some of the most salient characteristics of 
two ontological orientations in sociology. The first, we suggested, is the more ‘inward-looking’, 
attempts to draw rather clear borderlines around social reality in the form of various ‘social 
ontologies’, and envisions a segmented and/or stratified universe. The second, in contrast, is more 
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‘outward-looking’; it blurs, if not completely erases, the boundaries of social reality and de-
segments the universe in which sociologists operate. 
 As should already be clear from our preceding discussion, however, these two contrasting 
pictures should be conceived as general tendencies, which are articulated in different forms and 
with variable intensity by a range of very different theoretical traditions. Moreover, as we have 
also underlined above, there are many grey zones here. This means that, if the opposition 
highlighted in the article is taken to be an absolute one, this would be an aberration. But 
understood in relative terms, developing a clear sense of these two opposing tendencies can shed 
much light on, if we might say so, a ‘reality’ of our discipline. For the sociological literature is 
indeed permeated by a whole series of questions along these opposing lines: Should we look 
more inward or outward? How much qualitative distinctiveness and/or causal autonomy can we 
attribute to sociological phenomena? Should we envision a segmented or open universe? Should 
we be more wary of reductionism or essentialism? And, perhaps above all, where should we draw 
the limits of sociological inquiry? 
 For a long time now, sociologists have not been able to come to an agreement about those 
questions. This is the most obvious diagnosis about the ‘state of the discipline’ that follows from 
our analysis. This diagnosis, however, leads us towards anything but a closure. In fact, sooner or 
later it makes us stumble upon another – but this time perhaps far more ‘existential’ – problem, 
with which it is worth concluding this article. 
 To draw the broadest contours of this problem, it is worth paying closer attention to a 
point that was rather implicit in our analysis above: ontological theories in sociology almost 
always involve various propositions about ‘ourselves’ (as beings existing in society or, at the very 
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least, constituting one of its conditions of possibility). To cite a few examples from the works we 
discussed earlier, such propositions range from ‘we are beings capable of meaningful action’ to 
‘we are self-referential minds that are structurally coupled to self-referential communicative 
systems’, and from ‘we are beings constrained by forces beyond our control and yet capable of 
giving a shape to our existence through our internal conversations’  to ‘we are “a whole 
assemblage of plug-ins coming from completely different loci” (Latour, 2005: 208)’ – and so on. 
In this sense, integral to various technical and conceptual issues addressed by contributors to 
different ontological orientations are divergent propositions about what we are and what we can 
become.
10
 
 And, it is precisely when we try to make sense of this diversity that we encounter the 
signs of a major dilemma. One can interpret this diversity as a failure: for if sociologists are not 
going to offer clear answers about those questions, who will? But one can also rejoice at the idea 
that, thanks to its ontological plurality, sociology provides a platform for conceiving ourselves in 
multiple ways. Formulated in the specific terminology of this article, this dilemma can be 
summarized as follows. 
 Seen from one angle, the absence of an agreement about the boundaries of sociological 
phenomena can be interpreted as a shortcoming. After all, would sociology not turn into a more 
respectful, self-confident and productive discipline, if it could establish its ontological boundaries 
more precisely? One might, therefore, come to the conclusion that it is an urgent task for 
sociologists to overcome this absence by developing more ‘agreeable’ answers to the questions 
cited above. Looking at the issue from a very different angle, however, one might doubt whether 
it would be such a ‘good thing’ to have perfect answers to those questions. Do we, one might ask, 
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actually want to ascertain the limits of sociology once and for all? Or, should we perhaps 
embrace the fact that sociologists constantly build, undo and re-build the boundaries of their 
subject matter, because this is what makes sociology a unique discipline after all? 
Notes
                                                           
1
 This is particularly the case with Marxian theory, which has been articulated with all the exemplary social 
ontologies comprising the first orientation – i.e. those of Weber and Durkheim (Giddens, 1973) as well as critical 
realism (Collier, 1989; Sayer, 1981). It has, however, also been pointed out that Marxian sociology shares a common 
ground with some of the perspectives comprising the second orientation (e.g. Law, 1992: 389) – and, one might 
indeed wonder whether Marx’s well-known comments on the ‘hand-mill’ and ‘steam engine’, as well as Engels’s 
discussion of the sacredness of the ‘dwelling’ in Germanic societies are so far away from the emphasis on non-
human actors in actor-network theory. But perhaps the most vivid example of how a theoretical approach inspired 
by this tradition can incorporate, albeit in a highly critical manner, both orientations can be found in a relatively 
little-noticed essay – simply titled ‘Society’ – by Adorno. Here, Adorno (1969-1970: 144) maintains that ‘society’ is 
‘essentially process’ and ‘elude[s] verbal definition’; as such, all ‘attempts to fix its limits’ are bound to be 
problematic. This might seem like a frontal attack on the first ontological orientation. Yet, Adorno also opposes the 
attempts to treat ‘society’ as a vacuous notion, insisting that even if it is not a directly observable entity, we would 
not be able to make sense of our actual relations without alluding to it; our social lives presuppose the idea of 
society, while this idea itself is often based on our experience of our concrete interactions. Thus, Adorno argues that 
the ideas we have about the nature of social reality often involve an element of truth, but these are necessarily 
partial and historically contingent truths. More generally, this implies that we can neither simply do away with the 
idea of society as a sui generis object, nor assume that the meaning and limits of this object can be fixed once and 
for all (Adorno, 1969-1970; 1999; Jameson, 1990). Since Adorno wrote at a time before the recent ontological 
‘turns’ in sociology, however, it is almost impossible to predict whether he would sympathise with any of the 
current attempts that will be discussed in this article. 
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2
 For detailed comparisons in terms of methodology and epistemology, see, for example: Jensen (2012) and Rose 
(1981). 
3
 It has often been noted that the relative neglect of Tarde’s and Spencer’s works in the early sociological literature 
was partly due to Durkheim’s – rather unfair – criticisms. He attacked Tarde for being too ‘psychologistic’ (Deleuze, 
1994: 314) and accused Spencer with ‘narrow utilitarianism’ (Offer, 2010b: 178-182). 
4
 Here we exclude from our discussion the sociobiological theories launched in 1970s (e.g. Wilson, 1975; Barash, 
1979), which, as several critics have underlined, tend to go in the direction of some form of biologic reductionism 
(Gould, 1978; Sahlins, 1979). 
5
 According to Richardson (2004), a similar idea was also central to Nietzsche’s work. 
6
 Luhmann’s work differs considerably from earlier sociological theories that allude to the notion of system. See: 
Murphy (1982). 
7
 Luhmann, of course, does not suggest that there is no difference whatsoever between social and other systems. 
Social systems are neither living, nor conscious systems (Luhmann, 1995:40, 60-80, 220). But these differences stem 
from the particularities of a system in terms of information processing; they do not surpass the common, 
fundamental quality of self-referentiality. 
8
 ANT is not alone in relying on metaphors in its formulations. Thus, in addition to the ‘metaphor of heterogeneous 
networks’, we have the ‘metaphor of strata’ (Collier, 1989:44), as well as ‘internal conversations’, ‘communicative 
systems’, ‘memes’ and so on. Nor is this metaphorical language unique to sociology. As Hadot (2006) shows, many 
fundamental ontological categories in philosophy – e.g. ‘nature’ – are not used in their original, ‘literal’ sense either. 
One might, then, wonder whether it is possible to propose an ontology – social or otherwise – without having 
recourse to metaphors. At the very least, it might be worth noting here that, more often than not, the theorists 
considered in this article proceed with questions such as ‘what is society/culture like?’ , ‘what is a social actor like?’, 
‘what is it not like?’ and so on. 
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9
 In a similar vein, Foucault (1980:195) describes the main ‘object’ of his analysis as ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’. Schatzki’s (2003) ‘site 
ontology’ also partly resonates with this idea. 
10
 This implies that ontological theories in sociology often entail political and ethical propositions. See, especially: 
Woolgar and Lezaun (2013). See, also: Archer (1995, 2003), who explicitly utilizes her social ontology to defend 
humanist perspectives in sociology, and Latour (2005:258-262), who argues that ‘symmetrisation’ of human and 
non-human actors constitutes a necessary step in making sociology a politically relevant discipline in the 
contemporary world. 
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TABLE 1: 
An overview of the main conceptual distinctions and exemplary theories used in the article. 
 
Qualitative 
Distinctiveness 
Causal  
Autonomy 
Exemplary  
Theories 
 
Ontological Orientation I 
(Building social ontologies) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
Social Ontologies of: 
 
Durkheim 
 
Weber 
 
Critical Realists 
 
 
Ontological Orientation II 
(Blurring the boundaries of 
the ‘social’) 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
Evolutionary 
Approaches 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
Luhmann’s Social 
Systems Theory 
 
- 
 
- 
 
ANT 
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